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ABSTRACT 
Severing the link between the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Jolo population 
is critical to destroying the terrorist organization.  The U.S. support to Philippine Security 
Forces (PSF) has helped to capture or kill the ideological cadre of the ASG, but it fails to 
prevent younger rebels from taking their place.  While PSF continue to aggressively 
pursue the ASG, the U.S. has provided abundant assistance to improve the livelihood of 
the Jolo population.  Positive results from the U.S.-supported development can be 
observed through increased access to healthcare and education.  However, the strategy 
may fail to target a key demographic of the Jolo population, adolescent males, who 
currently make up approximately 80% of the ASG’s estimated population of 400 rebels.  
To prevent their recruitment by the ASG, operations and development on Jolo must not 
marginalize adolescent males.  The warrior traditions of the native Tausugs on Jolo 
present a challenge when it comes to addressing the needs of adolescent males and 
encouraging their participation in the security and development of Jolo vice participation 
in rebellious or illicit activities. 
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In 2004, the Philippine SuperFerry 14 was torn apart by a violent explosion in the 
lower decks of the passenger seating area, killing 114 passengers.1  Responsibility for the 
devastating attack was claimed by a little known terrorist organization located in the Sulu 
Archipelago of the southern Philippines, known as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).  
Initially dismissed as a prank, forensic evidence later confirmed the statements of the 
captured bomber and launched the ASG to the forefront of terrorist organizations 
operating in South East Asia.2  The ASG was no longer seen as a minor criminal 
organization focused primarily on kidnap for ransom (KFR) schemes in the southern 
Philippines, targeting tourists and foreign businessmen. 
The ASG’s historical ties to Al Qaeda and cooperation with the Indonesian-based 
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) have compelled the U.S. to support the Government of the Republic 
of the Philippines (GRP) as its security forces aggressively pursue the ASG in the 
southern Philippines.  On the island of Jolo, the U.S. and the GRP are using a 
combination of combat operations to destroy the ASG with population-focused 
operations designed to sever the links between the ASG and the Jolo population.  There 
have been successes against the ASG noted by the Agence France-Presse, which reported 
at least 70 rebels killed in 2009 and the overall strength of the ASG reduced from over 
1000 to approximately 400.  However, the dead rebels have come at a great cost to the 
population and to Philippine Security Forces (PSF), which have lost at least 48 soldiers to 
the ASG in 2009 alone.3  Many of the Islamist ideologues who founded the ASG have 
been captured or killed, but the organization continues to recruit new rebels from the Jolo 
population and its ranks may be growing once again.4 
                                                 
1 Simon Elegant, “The Return of Abu Sayyaf,” Time, August 23, 2004. 
2 Elegant, “The Return of Abu Sayyaf.” 
3 Agence France-Presse, “Abu Sayyaf survives U.S.-backed Philippine crackdown,” 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20091111-235574/Abu-Sayyaf-survives-US-
backed-Philippine-crackdown (accessed on line November 22, 2009). 
4 Jim Gomez, “Abu Sayyaf Back to Terror,” Washington Times, February 21, 2009. 
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As the U.S. and GRP pursue the ASG through combat operations it is critical to 
deny the ASG the ability to recruit from the population.  Approximately 80% of the 
ASG’s rebels are males under the age of 25, high school dropouts who are looking for 
monetary gain through the organization’s criminal activities.5  This thesis intends to 
argue that unique approaches are necessary to deny recruitment of adolescent males by 
the ASG whose appeal is based, in part, on the warrior traditions of Jolo’s native 
inhabitants, the Tausugs.  The U.S. and GRP have worked to improve conditions for 
Jolo’s inhabitants through infrastructure development and increased access to education 
and healthcare.  This has had a positive impact on the Jolo population.  But the continued 
lack of security prevents any further development and without economic development the 
GRP may find itself dealing with a healthy, educated, but disaffected generation of 
adolescent males lured to the ASG. 
Much of this thesis draws on my first-hand experiences in Jolo in 2006, as well as 
on conceptual literature that helps explain why adolescent males may be drawn to 
organizations like the ASG.  Serving as an advisor to Philippine military units on Jolo 
offered me many opportunities to interact with native Tausugs, particularly while 
conducting humanitarian or development missions.  Understanding the Tausugs is critical 
because the ASG is comprised almost entirely of Tausug rebels.  The second chapter of 
this thesis will introduce the ASG and describe why it survives on Jolo today.  The third 
chapter introduces the Tausugs of Jolo and explains how the Tausugs’ warrior traditions 
necessitate a unique approach if the rebellion on Jolo is to be subdued.  The fourth 
chapter will briefly review the U.S. and GRP strategy on Jolo and its effects on the 
Tausug population.  The fifth chapter will discuss why adolescent males, on Jolo in 
particular, deserve specific attention and recommend programs that may serve to deter 
the interest of adolescent males in the ASG. 
 
                                                 
5 Agence France-Presse, “Abu Sayyaf Survives.” 
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II. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP  
A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP 
The ASG, originally named Al Harakat Al Islamiya, was founded around 1989 by 
Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani following his return to the southern Philippines after 
fighting with the Mujahideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan.    The goal of the ASG 
was the establishment of an Islamic State of Mindanao and the expulsion of all Christian 
influence in the region.  As indicated in an ASG proclamation, “Surah J-al Fatiha,” the 
organization’s objective was to liberate Muslim Mindanao from the perceived tyranny 
and oppression of the Catholic Philippine government and the armed forces.6  While the 
original goal was predicated on an independent Mindanao, Janjalani eventually aligned 
the ASG’s goals with those of Al Qaeda and the regional and global spread of Islam 
through armed struggle. 
A graduate of several prominent Islamic universities in Syria, Libya, and Saudi 
Arabia, Janjalani and his younger brother, Khaddafy Janjalani, were instrumental in 
recruiting and training Moros for jihad in Afghanistan and Pakistan.7  As a result, 
Janjalani developed close ties to Osama Bin Laden, and was instrumental in the 
establishment of an Al Qaeda foothold in Mindanao.8  Through Janjalani’s connections 
with Al Qaeda, the ASG received large amounts of money and additional military 
training.  Though small in size, the group was heavily populated with experienced 
fighters from Afghanistan and within months of organizing the ASG undertook violent 
action. 
Between 1991 and 1996, at least 67 terrorist attacks were linked to the ASG.  The 
ASG also played a supporting role in Al Qaeda plots to assassinate Pope John Paul II and 
                                                 
6 Peter Chalk, “US Security Assistance to Philippines: A Success Story Against Terrorism,” CTC 
Sentinel, February 2008, 4. 
7 Lino Miani, "Arms Trafficking in the Sulu Region and National Responses to a Regional Problem."  
PhD  Dissertation (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, 2009), 59. 
8 Miani, “Arms Trafficking,” 59. 
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President Bill Clinton.9  The ASG’s successful operations backed by its accepted 
ideology in the Muslim world gained the group notoriety and the eventual support of the 
governments of Iraq and Iran, and also organizations such as Hamas, Jema’ah Islamiya, 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Kumpulan Mujahadin Malaysia, and both the 
Egyptian and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.10  Ironically, however, the ASG’s quick rise to 
prominence in the world of terrorism also led to its swift decline. 
B. THE EARLY FALL OF THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP 
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP) 
launched a concerted effort against the ASG that resulted in the death of Abdurajak 
Janjalani in 1998 on the island of Basilan11.  From that moment, the ASG lost its 
ideological drive and focused its activities instead on profit-driven illicit activities.12  
Most notorious was the Malaysian Sipadan Island resort raid in 2000 in which the ASG 
captured 25 mostly western tourists, including three Americans.  With millions of dollars 
paid in ransom for the tourists, the ASG failed to reorganize and, instead, remained 
focused on illicit activities rather than resuming the ideological role envisioned by its 
founders.  Further, in response to the raid on the resort, the governments of Malaysia and 
Indonesia joined with the Philippines in fighting transnational crime, increasing pressure 
on regional terrorist and insurgent organizations that exploited the island borders of all 
three countries.  Lastly, the apparent disregard for ideology and the ASG’s focus on 
profiteering drove away the last of the ASG’s external Muslim supporters, and by 2001 
there is little evidence of any external support for the ASG.13 
                                                 
9 Zachary Abuza, “Al Qaeda Comes to Southeast Asia,” in Paul J. Smith (ed.), Terrorism and Violence 
in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 
2005),  52. 
10 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Runding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed - and How to Stop It (Chicago: Bonus 
Books, 2005), cited by Lino Miani, “Arms Trafficking in the Sulu Region and National Responses to a 
Regional Problem,” 60. 
11 Chalk, “US Security Assistance,” 4. 
12 Lino Miani, "Arms Trafficking in the Sulu Region and National Responses to a Regional Problem,"  
60. 
13 Miani, “Arms Trafficking,” 61. 
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C. A FLEETING REEMERGENCE 
Continued pressure against the ASG by the AFP and PNP, as well as support from 
U.S. forces starting in 2001, also wore down popular local support for the ASG.  The 
peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) eliminated the arms market 
that kept the ASG viable.  Yet, despite the capture and killing of many of the ASG’s 
factional leaders in 2002, Khaddafy Janjalani, Abdurajak’s younger brother, was able to 
regain control and reestablish the organization, while also returning it to its ideological 
roots.14  Cooperating with Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI), the ASG initiated a new series of 
terrorist attacks in 2004 that culminated in the bombing of Superferry 14.  Not only was 
this the worst terrorist attack in maritime history, but ranks as the world’s fourth deadliest 
strike since 9/11.15 
The brutality of this attack resulted in a series of successful AFP operations 
against the ASG which significantly decreased its numbers and diminished its strength, 
and also isolated the organization from JI’s logistical and financial support.  With the 
death of Khaddafy and other prominent leaders between 2006 and 2007, the ASG leaned 
heavily on its ties with the MNLF and MILF.16  While this cooperation threatened the 
peace process in the southern Philippines, with Khaddafy’s death the ASG once again 
lost its ideology and refocused on profiteering through illicit activity.  Relying on its 
regional ties, the ASG blended back into the population and members fell back on family 
networks and traditions for protection and legitimacy. 
While the fight in the southern Philippines is far from over, the purpose behind 
the ASG’s activities has changed.  The AFP commander running military operations in 
the South, and long-time veteran of the war-torn islands, Major General Juancho Sabban, 
believes the ASG is no longer fighting for a cause.  “All the Abu Sayyaf’s ideologues are 
dead; the ones left behind are bandits.  The support they’re counting on from other 
                                                 
14 Miani, “Arms Trafficking,” 62. 
15 Simon Elegant, “The Return of Abu Sayyaf,” Time, August 23, 2004. 
16 Jonathan Adams, “In Basilan, Philippines, a US counterterrorism model frays,” Christian Science 
Monitor, December 11, 2008. 
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countries has vanished.  Now, everybody’s on his own, trying to raise money through 
kidnappings.”17  Following the disappearance of Radulan Sahiron, who was the last of 
the old cadre, in December of 2008, a new and younger generation of local leaders is 
competing for control of the ASG. 
To maintain support from the local population, the ASG relies heavily on its 
members’ familial ties and has always been careful about how the organization conducts 
its operations.  Historically, the ASG has emphasized targeting non-Tausugs and non-
Muslims.  Current ASG operations seem to follow this same pattern, whether the ASG is 
targeting the Jolo infrastructure or conducting kidnappings for ransom.  The most recent 
abductions of ICRC workers on Jolo indicate the organization’s continued emphasis on 
foreigners.  In this manner, the ASG can avoid alienating family support which it relies 
on for providing material resources and a safe haven.  So long as the ASG continues to 
target security forces – the symbol of Philippine government control—or non-Tausugs, it 
is not likely the local population on Jolo will ever turn on the ASG. 
D. FROM IDEOLOGY TO PROFIT 
As the Philippine security forces, backed by the U.S. military, continue to reduce 
the ranks of the ASG, and as USAID (as well as other NGO/GO) sponsored programs 
encourage development on Jolo, the ASG was forced to adapt and adjust its operations in 
order to survive.  Increased combat operations by the MILF as it confronts the Philippine 
military provided opportunities for the ASG to acquire smuggled weapons and military 
supplies, but a growing naval presence in the Sulu Archipelago and multilateral 
cooperation between the U.S., Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia will make these 
opportunities very risky.18  Already, the ASG has expanded into the realm of narcotics 
trafficking.  A 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) released by 
the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs discloses that the ASG was “engaged in providing security for marijuana 
cultivation, protection for drug trafficking organization operations, and local drug 
                                                 
17 Gomez, “Abu Sayyaf Back.”   
18 Miani, “Arms Trafficking,” 109. 
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distribution operations.”19  Coupled with the kidnappings for ransom, ASG activity 
seems focused heavily on profiteering through illicit means. 
Increased criminal activity will likely alienate the ASG, once again, from the 
Muslim extremist organizations that funded and supported the ASG insurgency 
previously.  It is possible that the AFP’s success against the ASG, along with the ASG’s 
detrimental loss of personnel, has forced it into illicit activities in order to rebuild and 
recruit.  The lucrative potential for profiteering tied to drugs can be enticing to young 
men who have no real potential in legitimate society.  If the ASG can survive through 
illicit activities, perhaps it can hold on long enough for a new generation of 
fundamentalist leaders or ideologues to consolidate the organization and refocus its 
efforts in keeping with the principles that led to its creation.  To do so, the ASG could 
rely heavily on its links to the Tausug population of Jolo and its members’ strong 
commitment to family above all else. 
                                                 
19 As referenced in Michaela P. del Callar, “US links ASG, NPA to drug trafficking in RP,” The Daily 
Tribune, March 2, 2009. 
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III. THE TAUSUG 
A. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
The Tausug people of the southern Philippines comprise a very small ethnic group 
and, as such, very little literature exists about the population.  According to the 2007 
Philippine government survey, Sulu Province, home to the Tausugs, has a population of 
849,670 people, a little over 620,000 of whom live on the island of Jolo.20  While it may 
seem easy to disregard such a small demographic amongst thousands of ethnic groups in 
Southeast Asia, understanding the Tausugs may prove critical to defeating the ASG and 
ending centuries of insurgent violence in the southern Philippines.  The Tausugs’ unique 
culture, strong familial relationships, and fierce warrior traditions are at the foundation of 
organizations such as the ASG, and some of the lessons to be learned might well apply to 
other insurgent groups that struggle for autonomy or independence from the Government 
of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). 
B. WHAT IS A TAUSUG? 
The Tausug people have inhabited the Sulu Archipelago for around 1000 years.  
Their language is closely related to many languages spoken in the Central Philippines 
and, racially, they are very little different from Filipinos to the north, although no Tausug 
considers himself a Filipino.  While Tausugs are spread across the Archipelago, from the 
southern shores of Mindanao all the way to the northern shores of Borneo, the island of 
Jolo has historically been dominated by the Tausug and has been the center of Tausug 
politics.  It is also home to the site of the historic Tausug Sultanate of Sulu, whose Sultan 
abdicated all secular power to the U.S. in 1915.21 
Islam spread through the southern Philippines during the 14th century, but, thanks 
to the arrival of the Spanish in the 16th century did not spread north of Mindanao.  For the 
                                                 
20 National Statistics Office, Republic of the Philippines, 
http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/2007/municipality.pdf (accessed August 26, 2009). 
21 Thomas M. Kiefer, The Tausug: Violence and Law in a Philippine Moslem Society, (Illinois: 
Waveland Press, 1986).  Very little is published beyond Kiefer’s contributions to the study of the Tausugs, 
unless noted otherwise, Kiefer is used exclusively for this introduction to the Tausugs. 
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next 300 years, the Spanish were at war with Muslims as Spain attempted to spread 
Christianity throughout the Philippine islands and violently convert the “Moros,” a 
nickname borrowed from the Spanish fight against the Muslim Moors in southern Spain.  
Such prolonged resistance against Christian conversion unified many of the different 
ethnic groups of the southern Philippines and firmly entrenched Islam in the region.  
Spanish colonization was only the start of what Tausugs consider to be centuries of 
religious persecution and justified resistance against Christian governments. 
Even with the replacement of the Spanish by the Americans, the Tausugs have 
continued to defend their lands against what they regard as Christian control of their 
formerly independent state.  The fact that many of the islands in the southern Philippines, 
including the Tausug island of Jolo, were once independent and were never obeisant to 
the Philippine government is not lost on the population and helps explain why some 
Tausugs remain resistant to GRP control. 
C. JOLO SUBSISTENCE AND ECONOMY 
1. Land Settlement 
Tausugs live in dispersed settlements outside the towns of Jolo Island.  
Households are most often located near working tracts of land, but Tausugs may site 
villages defensively, especially where there is a history of local feuding.  Each household 
sits at the center of a series of social and territorial relations.  However, there are no 
distinct social groups or boundaries to speak of.  Rather, the society divides into loosely 
defined social and spatial units as observed from each individual’s vantage point. 
The first of these territorial units is the household.  Households, which include the 
members of two or three generations of one family, generally occupy a single-room 
bamboo hut with nipa palm roof built off the ground to keep the house cool and 
discourage insects.  Most houses have a series of exterior porches and a disconnected 
kitchen.  Clusters of households are often composed of close kinsmen and comprise the 
next level territorial unit.  One does not have to be close kin to live within a household 
cluster.  
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Hamlets are composed of several household clusters.  The hamlet is not defined 
by territorial space, but by family relations, as well as the proximity of clusters to each 
other.  In this case, it is not necessary that the local leadership be located within the 
center of the hamlet or even in the densest cluster of households.  The most clearly 
defined center of leadership, instead, comes at the next level, that of the community.  The 
community is identified by a core group of leaders who support one among their number 
in particular.  He is the headman, and goes by a collective name recognized by outsiders.  
Hamlets and communities are not comprised wholly of kin, but contain networks 
connected through their social relations who have reached a consensus that the presiding 
headmen maintain control and authority within their communities. 
Even today, community boundaries are not distinct.  This is especially apparent in 
areas of low population or sparse development.  Solidarity within a community is 
dependent on several factors: the strength of the headman, marriages within a 
community, attendance at public activities, and the prevalence of recent feuding.  A 
strong community led by a powerful headman may be able to exert influence over 
surrounding communities through political manipulation, thereby creating a region.  
Regions today are generally represented by elected government officials.  While the 
officials are Tausug, they are somewhat (but not wholly) removed from the traditional 
Tausug system.  Regionally elected officials still rely heavily on their family bonds and 
extensive alliances to maintain power over the region and control within the family. 
The next level up from the region is that of the island itself.  At this level, two 
simple distinctions can be made, between Tausugs of the interior and Tausugs of the 
beach.  Finally, there is the world of Islam.  While the West is considered to be outside 
Tausugs’ world, what defines ‘the west’ has not been well appreciated by many Tausugs 
on Jolo, though this is rapidly changing due to increased access to education across the 




Jolo Island is a rugged volcanic island with a rich variety of vegetation and micro 
climates.  Once covered in dense tropical rainforest, much of the island has been 
converted to support a variety of agricultural products.  Open grassy savannahs are ideal 
for dry rice cultivation, while tall coconut groves tower over cassava plants.  Livestock is 
minimal and used mainly to support individual households.  Dense forests still exist at the 
higher elevations, up to or above 3000 feet, and the island is surrounded by coral reefs 
and mangrove swamps along the southern coast. 
Jolo is the capital city and center of commerce and trade, as well as government 
authority.  Traditionally the seat of the sultanate, Jolo is a city of mixed populations, 
including a considerable number of Christian Filipinos serving as government officials 
and in other professional capacities.  A few large towns are spread across the island, but 
these towns, like the rest of the island outside of Jolo City, are primarily inhabited by 
Tausugs. 
Traditionally, land settlement and cultivation are very different from what is 
familiar to most Westerners.  Land can be inherited and owned according to customary 
Tausug law.  Land can also be rented, or “borrowed,” for a nominal fee paid to the 
owner.  These rights can be inherited as well.  Land may also be “borrowed” for 
cultivating cassava, but in this case it is not customary to pay for the right.  To cultivate 
coconuts, it is not necessary to own the land below the tree and the trees can be passed 
along to descendents.  These agricultural practices hint at the significance of Tausug 
customary law. 
Traditional methods of farming are still practiced over most of Jolo.  In 
accordance with the Muslim calendar, crops are planted simultaneously across the island.  
This also reduces chances that birds may pick all the seeds, and during the planting 
period all fowl must be caged.  Harvesting is generally done communally on a reciprocal 
basis and certain percentages are shared between families, as well as with religious 
leaders and landlords.  Historically, rice was the dominant crop, but that has changed 
over the years and has been replaced by fishing. 
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3. Fishing 
Many traditional methods are still used for fishing.  Rattan nets are woven to net 
fish and poisons made from local plants are used to stun fish in shallow waters.  Large 
woven nets are used by full-time fisherman, while traditional boats may now sport gas 
motors.  While discouraged and even illegal in some places, the use of dynamite is also 
still common today.  Tausugs from the interior will routinely travel to the coasts to fish, 
but many rely on markets for the purchase of fresh fish, which is consumed several times 
a week.  While the waters around Jolo are still adequate for providing for local 
consumption, full-time fishermen are increasingly forced to compete with larger and 
better equipped vessels. 
4. Trade and Industry 
Much of the rural population still uses small markets for the sale and purchase of 
local commodities, primarily food.  As the road networks improve on Jolo, so does the 
access to finished products.  It is not uncommon to see small markets that convene only 
once or twice a week with packaged foods or beverages for sale.  Larger towns carry a 
greater supply of finished products in small stores and specialty shops.  Small shops and 
food stands with a constant access to electricity provide fresh baked goods, cold 
beverages and even ice cream.  Some towns may even offer movies to rent, as well as 
home or agricultural hardware, and a variety of fuels for sale.  The proximity of these 
finished goods, as well as food markets, means local inhabitants are not forced to travel 
far beyond their local communities.  Whatever necessities cannot be found locally can 
certainly be found in Jolo City. 
With a population of around 90,000, Jolo Town is a thriving and growing urban 
community.  Jolo Town contains everything enjoyed by most modern cities – refrigerated 
grocery stores, hospitals, universities, internet access, banks and a busy port to support a 
growing economy.  Passenger superferries and cargo ships routinely pass through the 
Jolo ports, moving people between the islands, depositing finished products, and taking 
away raw materials. 
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The increasing commercial activity in Jolo Town is indicative of a modernizing 
economy but, also highlights a critical problem: the inhabitants of Jolo have no industry 
to speak of and export only a few raw materials beyond coconut, charcoal, and seafood.  
Despite a modernizing capital city – albeit relatively poor in comparison to the larger 
Christian-dominated cities to the north – the remainder of the island is seeing very little 
development.  Yet, until Jolo experiences a greater level of security, it is not likely that 
the island will receive the necessary investment to expand development beyond Jolo City. 
D. ISLAM IN TAUSUG SOCIETY 
Tausug religion is a folk version of Islam, incorporating most of its major 
tenets, yet also maintaining many features of ritual and belief which are 
either survivals of a time when the Tausug were not yet Muslim or else 
reworkings of orthodox Muslim ideas into a new and unique synthesis.  In 
addition there are numerous religious practices which have little basis in 
orthodox Islam.22   
While anthropologist Thomas Kiefer’s description was doubtless true of the 
Tausugs in the late 1960s, Islam today on Jolo is much more similar to the orthodox 
Islam seen around the Muslim world.  What is most important to note is that Islam has 
played a critical role in holding Tausug society together despite centuries of feuding, and 
it has helped keep the Muslims in the Philippines united against Christian colonizers and, 
more recently, the Christian Philippine government. 
Folk Islam on Jolo today is predominantly observed by the elderly and by married 
women.  Because of the cultural expectation that young men will behave “badly” 
according to Islamic tenets, men do not strictly observe Islam until they are at an age to 
settle down and seek a peaceful and productive life.  Consequently, young males remain 
free to pursue activities otherwise prohibited by Islam and not condoned by religious 
leaders.  In a number of other senses as well, Tausug observance of Islam incorporates 
some unique elements not part of Islamic tradition. 
God has always existed in Tausug religious belief and variations of God were 
easy to adapt when Islam arrived in the southern Philippines.  But other aspects of 
                                                 
22 Kiefer, The Tausug, 112. 
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Tausug folklore were also retained and are occasionally observed in Tausug rituals.  For 
instance, other supernatural beings and lesser spirits inhabit many places, both in nature 
and in non-natural locations.  While not normally associated with Islam, the spirits are 
classified as those who either do the bidding of God or those who violate the 
commandments of God.  Evil spirits, for instance, are responsible for causing man 
suffering, but can be easily banished through the use of amulets and charms, as well as 
ritual offerings. 
While it is accepted that suffering is ultimately the will of God, an afflicted 
person can seek assistance through a priest or a curer.  A priest derives his knowledge 
from the traditions and tenets of the Quran while curers draw their knowledge from their 
experiences with the offending spirits.  It is common, even today, for Tausugs to recite 
Muslim prayers, provide offerings to a curer, wear protective or rehabilitative amulets, 
and still seek medical care through established clinics and doctors.  One can see much the 
same variety even when it comes to the Tausug version of the Five Pillars of Islam. 
Despite the fact that Tausugs readily accept one true God according to the first 
pillar, they still believe in lesser spirits.  The second pillar, dealing with five daily 
prayers, is really only practiced by elderly men expected to maintain a degree of religious 
piety.  Otherwise, Friday is the only traditionally observed day of prayer on Jolo.  Fasting 
during Ramadan, the third pillar, is also strictly observed only by the elderly.  The fourth 
pillar, the giving of alms, is only necessary if an individual receives a bountiful rice 
harvest and is supported only thanks to the belief that the failure to provide alms may 
lead to a poor harvest the following year.  Finally, the fifth pillar, pilgrimage to Mecca, is 
not common in the poorer villages of Jolo.  A pious life is considered a reasonable 
substitute. 
Despite the variations of folk Islam practiced on Jolo, the religion has served to 
unify the Tausugs against the non-Muslim GRP.  Without the perceived aggression by the 
Christian GRP, Tausugs would likely remain factionalized and focused on smaller-scale 
regional or family issues.  The importance of family and friendship networks is explored 
further below. 
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E. THE VALUE OF KINSHIP 
1. Blood, Cousins and the World 
The value of kinship cannot be underestimated in Tausug society.  In Thomas M. 
Kiefer’s anthropological study The Tausug, he notes that “kinship bonds form the cement 
in which a variety of political, economic, and military obligations are expressed.”23  This 
is relevant not only for Tausugs’ day-to-day social interaction, but, for Tausugs dealing 
with outsiders as well.  As degrees of relatedness decrease, so does loyalty, along with 
the frequency of social interactions.  In contrast, the potential for violence rises.  As the 
Government of the Philippines (GRP) attempts to assert its authority over islands like 
Jolo, it is not too hard to see how easily Tausugs might pick up arms against government 
security forces since soldiers do not fall within the realm of kinship at all.  Nor can they 
be considered ‘brothers’ in Islam. 
Tausugs identify kinsmen through ever-expanding circles of relationship on both 
their father’s and the mother’s side.  The closeness of the relative implies certain 
obligations between the kin regarding every aspect of social interaction, especially in 
terms of violence.  The degrees of kinship are based on blood relationships, the closest of 
connections being to one’s father, mother, siblings, uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, and 
first cousins.  Beyond immediate kin, distant kin include all blood and marriage relations, 
no matter how distant.  It is expected that an individual will know the names of all close 
kin, even if they do not live nearby.  It is also very likely that they will know the names 
of distant kin, including second and third cousins.  Maintaining awareness of the degrees 
of relatedness identifies the categories “of persons that the individual can rely on for 
support and assistance in both everyday activities as well as significant crises.”24 
2. Friends and Enemies 
The complexity of Tausug relationships increases beyond the realm of kinship 
and includes varying degrees of friends and enemies.  “Friendship and enmity are the 
                                                 
23 Kiefer, The Tausug, 28. 
24 Kiefer, The Tausug, 31. 
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pivotal concepts in the social organization of Tausug violence.”25  The individual cannot 
defend his interests alone and has to rely on friends.  Equally important, the individual 
must be aware of his enemy’s supporters before engaging in any act of violence.  What 
the Tausugs mean by the term “friend,” therefore, is not what is implied by the western 
translation, which suggests a degree of emotional solidarity.  Rather, friendship is a form 
of social contract—an agreement to help another in exchange for help received.  The 
obligation is not legal but moral, and “sanctioned by the highest religious and ritual 
foundations of the society.”26  As such, the ideal friend is considered to be as close as a 
kinsman in both conduct and reliability. 
Kiefer identifies nine primary concepts in the Tausug domains of friendship and 
enmity, and describes the social conduct associated with these terms.  The obligations 
associated with these terms cannot be overestimated, as they help to determine expected 
support in the event of a crisis: 
1. Bagay magtaymanghud literally means “friends who act like brothers.”  
This relationship is sanctioned religiously and legally, but does not 
always require that the decision to enter into this bond has to be mutual.  
In some cases, the decision may have been reached between headmen 
who want two rivals to stop fighting or otherwise seek an honorable 
means to end a feud.  This relationship does not require an individual to 
provide any type of support, but denies him the right to inflict any type of 
violence.   
2. Bagay (close friends) enter this bond willingly and often as a means of 
creating networks of obligation among friends.  An individual with many 
close friends has a responsibility to each when his interests are at stake. 
At the same time the individual can count on mutual support from these 
many friends, especially when their interests are affected along with his.    
                                                 
25 Kiefer, The Tausug, 59. 
26 Kiefer, The Tausug, 60. 
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Military leaders and headmen will often have a wide range of close 
friends as their interests extend well beyond the local community. 
3. Bagay-bagay refers to a social contact, but one that creates no degree of 
obligation.  At the same time, people in a bagay-bagay relationship do 
not regard each other as enemies.   
4. Gapi means ally, and may actually refer to two individuals fighting side-
by-side with no social obligation to each other, but who fight side-by-
side out of obligation to other allied individuals.  Gapi are not friends but 
they also are not enemies.   
5. Tau hansipak are individuals allied to feuding individuals and enemies 
only due to an accidental configuration of alliances.  There may not be 
any enmity between the two and they may not even fight in a social 
situation, unless one or both of their personal enemies are present.   
6. Bantah are personal enemies and will likely try to kill each other if given 
the chance.  This term also refers to a legal category in which the enmity 
is recognized and formal mediation necessary to end the enmity without 
bloodshed. 
7. Tau ha ut are neutrals and may not be involved in a conflict.  Women, 
children and the elderly are not expected to partake in violence and are 
tau ha ut.  An individual may not participate in conflict because he has 
kinsmen or friends on both sides.  An individual will not be condemned 
for refusing to partake in a conflict unless an immediate blood relative is 
involved.   
8. Tindug are followers of a particular leader, whether a headman or religious 
leader.  The more tindug an individual has, the greater his renown.   
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9. Bata’an are followers who serve as bodyguards.  A Tausug headman will 
never leave his community without a number of bodyguards.  These 
serve both to impress others, as well as to protect him.27 
It is possible, but rare, that an individual can be both a friend and kinsman.  This 
may be true for distantly related kinsmen in different communities, but the value of 
kinship is ranked much higher than that of friendship.  Therefore, friendship is really 
about reciprocity, especially as it applies to violent conflict.  Levels and intensity of 
reciprocity can always increase, but can rarely decrease.  To not live up to reciprocal 
obligations brings self-inflicted shame to the man in debt and insults the individual he 
owes.  In the act of gift giving, this is especially important because a perceived slight can 
end an alliance, shatter a network of friendship ties, and/or result in a violent feud. 
F. HISTORY OF VIOLENCE AND MALE VALUES 
1. Causes for Conflict 
Reciprocal gift giving is pervasive throughout Tausug society and involves 
commodities, services and sentiments.  There are two distinct forms: quasi-contractual 
reciprocity, and a “debt of gratitude” (also known as buddi).  Contractual reciprocity is 
very precise and records are kept that document the type of reciprocity and amounts 
exchanged.  Such exchanges occur at social affairs, like weddings, and can include 
cooperative labor during planting and harvesting.  In contrast, Buddi is a much more 
nebulous arrangement and is sometimes difficult to quantify.  While the exchange may 
still be documented, a monetary value cannot easily be assigned to political support or 
military aid, for instance.  Therefore, a man will always try to repay more than necessary, 
“increasing the obligation further in his partner in an ever increasing spiral of 
reciprocity.”28 
The debt of gratitude is expected to be repaid spontaneously and should never 
have to be demanded, except in extreme cases that involve anger towards the debtor.  If a 
                                                 
27 Kiefer, The Tausug, 34–35. 
28 Kiefer, The Tausug, 66. 
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debt is not repaid when needed, a deep sense of rejection develops and, with Tausugs, 
this will often lead to rage and anger.  Failure to repay a debt of gratitude will force a 
feeling of shame on the individual and may create tension between kinsmen and/or 
between friends.  If an individual is unable to repay the debt, he will likely avoid the 
person he owes in order to prevent the feeling of shame that may lead to a violent 
situation. 
The pervasiveness of the sentiment of reciprocity in Tausug culture is 
further understood when we consider the importance of the value attached 
to vengeance, which is, after all, merely a special form of negative 
reciprocity in which men exchange hostile feelings that drive them apart 
instead of bring them together.29   
Like a debt of gratitude, vengeance, or a blood debt, must be repaid with interest, thereby 
shifting the burden of debt to the enemy.  This creates an escalating spiral of violence that 
will eventually create a situation in which “legal pressures are brought to bear and end 
the feud.”30  Failure to repay a blood debt, however, will also bring a deep sense of 
shame to the debtor. 
Interestingly, the sense of shame is perceived only by the individual who failed to 
repay a debt; it cannot be externally applied.  When an individual feels shame, he feels 
like he has lost esteem in the eyes of his relations and particularly in the eyes of his 
enemy.  His image must be restored because “bravery and masculinity is a major facet of 
an adult male’s image of himself.”31  It is expected in Tausug society that a man should 
fight back against an enemy.  Even if revenge is not successful, an individual can avoid 
shame by not backing down and therefore by not appearing cowardly in his relations or 
the enemy’s eyes.  It is rare, however, that an individual will attempt to pay back a blood 
debt without bringing overwhelming support from kinsmen and friends. 
                                                 
29 Kiefer, The Tausug, 66. 
30 Kiefer, The Tausug, 68. 
31 Kiefer, The Tausug, 68. 
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2. Alliances 
Alliances are always formed for military purposes and generally include family 
and friends from the same community.  Alliance groups are usually formed around a 
charismatic figure and only coalesce for a particular situation.  The most common form 
of alliance is for the defense of the community.  Long-term alliances are held together by 
charismatic leaders and, therefore, last only as long as the leader can maintain them, often 
dissipating once he is gone from the scene. Membership in an alliance goes beyond 
participating in a feud and includes the lending of weapons or assistance with the 
purchase of weapons and ammunition, as well as help with protecting the community and 
demonstrating support for a headman. 
Alliances formed beyond the community are rare and are often limited to a 
particular situation.  An alliance group leader with a cause broader than his community 
may seek assistance from distant kinsmen and friends belonging to alliance groups in 
other communities.  Alliance groups that respond to his request must be accommodated 
and provided with food, money, or resources for as long as they offer their support, and 
the leader needs assistance.  This is one reason alliance groups rarely form beyond an 
individual’s community.  One exception may be a hasty alliance that comes together in 
response to a particularly “heinous moral outrage” that impels all members to unite and 
respond against the transgressor.  Historical examples of this are communities uniting 
against colonial control of Jolo. 
Alliances beyond the community are very unstable and may shift often.  It is not 
uncommon for groups to fight for a particular cause and then on opposite sides later for a 
different cause.  As noted earlier, an alliance may be torn apart when a blood debt arises 
between two friends, and family and friends then find themselves having to reevaluate 
their relationships to each of the parties.  This can lead to new alliances, as well as new 
enmities.  Two enemies may unite on behalf of a common cause if its significance 
supersedes their feud. Such a cause may even end the feud, thereby eliminating the 
possibility of endless feuds that would ultimately pit everyone against everyone.   
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3. Risk-Taking and Adolescent Males 
“Risk taking in Tausug culture is encouraged, and the prudent lose the 
opportunity to demonstrate to their fellows valued virtues of character: bravado, honor, 
masculinity, and even magnanimity.”32  As such, a Tausug man may deliberately seek 
high-risk situations.  Piracy and banditry are both long-accepted historical forms of risk-
taking in Tausug society and complement the risks involved in blood feuds.  Tausugs 
have been noted historically for their military prowess and bravery in battle.  Certainly 
not all Tausugs enjoy fighting, but “for the young fighting is the supreme adventure.”33   
Tausug society draws a separation between what it expects from, and allows the 
young and what it permits the old.  “Young men are supposed to be hot blooded, violent, 
adventuresome, and—within the context of Islamic morality—“bad,” while the old are 
supposed to be peaceful, religiously inclined, and “good.””34 It is to be expected, then, 
that young Tausug men will readily assist kinsmen and friends in need of aid, especially 
when there is the threat of violence.  The dots should not be hard to connect between 
“traditional” Tausug values and the lure of the ASG.  Where there is an intriguing 
wrinkle is in Tausgs’ expectation that only older men and heads of household need to 
engage in “good” Muslim behavior.  This suggests that maybe a different kind of Muslim 
education needs to be done or new male only status competitions for young males might 
be introduced.  Before examining these possibilities in greater detail, the next chapter 
examines current U.S. and GRP policy on Jolo. 
 
                                                 
32 Kiefer, The Tausug, 83. 
33 Kiefer, The Tausug, 137. 
34 Kiefer, The Tausug, 137. 
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IV. THE JOLO COUNTERINSURGENCY MISSION 
A. THE JOLO MISSION 
1. U.S. Strategy 
Current strategy for Jolo differs from the earlier Basilan strategy due to concerns 
about local inhabitants’ perceptions of U.S. intent.  On Basilan, a large number of U.S. 
forces were used to advise and assist the Philippine Security Forces (PSF) as they 
executed their mission against the ASG.  Because the Jolo inhabitants were suspicious of 
the U.S., the U.S. presence was designed to be small to dispel any rumors the U.S. was 
secretly after Spanish treasure or World War II era Japanese gold.  With such a small 
number of U.S. advisors, it was necessary to devise an indirect strategy to secure and 
stabilize the island of Jolo, improve the impoverished conditions, and enhance the 
legitimacy of the GRP.  This strategy consisted of four main objectives: 1) counter the 
terrorists’/insurgents’ ability to discredit the GRP; 2) promote the legitimacy of the 
government by improving its ability to rule effectively and assist it demonstrate that 
ability to the people; 3) improve the GRP’s ability to target the terrorist groups; and 4) 
improve the ability of the GRP to demonstrate control and provide a secure and 
prosperous environment for the population.35 
This was the JSOTF-P mission statement for Sulu: 
 
JSOTF-P, in coordination with the U.S. country team, builds capacity and 
strengthens the Republic of the Philippines security forces to defeat 
selected terrorist organizations in order to protect Philippine and American 
citizens and interests from terrorist attack while preserving Philippine 
sovereignty (Approved by COMSOCPAC on 23 Aug 05).36 
a. Indirect Approach 
Also known as “through, by and with,” then-Brigadier General Donald 
Wurster and Colonel David Friedovich developed an indirect strategy for the OEF-P 
                                                 
35 Jonathon P. Hastings, “The Strategy-Legitimacy Paradigm: Getting it Right in the Philippines,” 
Master’s Thesis (Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008), 80. 
36 David Maxwell, “JSOTF-P Commander's Overview Brief” Ft Bragg. 23 February 2008.  Document 
stored in the NPS, DA Department CORE Lab archives. 
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mission, based on principles borrowed from Gordon McCormick’s Diamond Model.37  A 
variety of factors influenced the adoption of this approach, but most importantly was the 
restriction of foreign forces engaging in combat on Philippine soil.  As a result, the 
JSOTF-P could only advise and assist the PSF in their efforts against the ASG; it could 
not engage in combat operations.  To accomplish this task, the JSOTF-P worked closely 
with the U.S. country team to facilitate regular interagency coordination to produce 
optimal results.38  Applying the principles from the Diamond Model, and working within 
the political constraints of the Philippines, four lines of operations were developed for the 
island of Jolo. 
b. Four Lines of Operations 
(1) Building the Capacity of the PSF.  This approach was 
expanded beyond the earlier focus on just the AFP, and included the PNP as well as other 
security forces operating on Jolo.  The PSF had to demonstrate to the inhabitants on Jolo 
that it was capable of establishing a secure and stable environment.  Capacity building 
included advising and assisting ground units as well as maritime and aviation 
components.39 
(2) Targeted Civil Military Operations (CMO).  On Jolo, this 
consisted of U.S.-facilitated, but Philippine-led humanitarian and civic-action projects.  
The projects were targeted in the sense that they focused on populations that were most 
influenced by the ASG.  Not only were the projects designed to demonstrate the GRP’s 
concern for the population’s well-being and quality of life, but also to provide incentives 
to encourage inhabitants to reduce ties with the ASG. 
(3) Intelligence Operations.  The JSOTF-P worked closely with 
its AFP counterparts to improve their intelligence capabilities.  It also shared U.S. 
capabilities so as to enhance the analysis and dissemination of vital intelligence to the 
                                                 
37 Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect 
Approach.” Military Review, Nov–Dec 2006, 4.  In 1994, Dr. Gordon McCormick created the triangle 
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38 Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN,” 6. 
39 Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN,” 6. 
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appropriate organization.  Doing so created a better understanding of the enemy situation 
on Jolo and encouraged the sharing of information across organizations, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of operational success. 
(4) Information Operations (IO).  IO focused on the GRP 
success in the first two lines of operations.  Using a variety of means, information 
regarding civil-military activities and PSF successes against the ASG was spread across 
the island, enhancing GRP legitimacy and dispelling ASG propaganda regarding GRP 
intentions on Jolo. 
2. GRP Legitimacy 
Until the population of Jolo accepts the GRP as the legitimate governing body 
over Jolo, GRP success is always likely to be short-lived, whether against the ASG or in 
the development of Jolo.  The long and bloody history of resistance by the people of Jolo 
has created a deep resentment against any authority imposing its will over the island’s 
inhabitants.  The GRP’s fight against insurgent and terrorist forces on Jolo has exacted a 
heavy price.  Prior to U.S. involvement on Jolo, Major General Juancho Sabban of the 
AFP stated in an interview:  
For three decades we were using a strategy of force.  It turned out to be a 
vicious cycle.  We would have body count syndrome.  Commanders 
would become popular because they were warrior-like.  But I saw the 
more we destroyed, the more the number of the enemy increased.  There 
were so many instances of collateral damage and innocent lives being 
sacrificed.  Just by passing through fields with so many battalions we were 
already stomping on crops and that makes people resent the military.  In 
the course of a firefight school buildings would get burned, houses would 
be razed to the ground, civilians caught in the crossfire.  Everything was 
blamed on the military.40 
Since the arrival of U.S. forces on Jolo, a strategy that measures the effects of 
operations on the population has gained dominance.  Engagements are discriminate and 
even surgical.  This underscores GRP concern for the well-being of Jolo’s inhabitants.  It 
is now appreciated that respect for Jolo property and the lives of inhabitants, coupled 
                                                 
40 Max Boot and Richard Bennett, “Treading Softly in the Philippines: Why a low-intensity 
counterinsurgency strategy seems to be working there,” Weekly Standard, January 9, 2009, 14-16. 
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with increased security and development across the island, are essential if the GRP hopes 
to legitimize authority on Jolo.  In a zero sum type relationship, as the GRP’s legitimacy  
increases, it can be expected that the ASG’s legitimacy will decrease.  As a result, the 
PSF can expect an increased flow of information from the local inhabitants and greater 
cooperation in development projects, replacing the vicious cycle of violence and poverty 
with a “virtuous” cycle of cooperation and development. 
B. SECURITY 
1. PSF Capacity Building 
The AFP has to be able to provide a secure and stable environment as the front-
line force against the ASG.   Technologically, the AFP is extremely deficient compared 
to its U.S. counterparts.  However, significant advancements have been made in the 
AFP’s execution of operations through military cooperation with U.S. forces as well as 
through Subject Matter Expertise Exchanges (SMEE).  SMEEs are conducted with the 
assistance of U.S. advisors and are designed to improve the tactical and operational 
effectiveness of the AFP, improve the AFP’s technical proficiency, and create a more 
professional fighting force. 
Basic soldiering skills such as marksmanship, first-aid, and navigation, along with 
small unit tactics at the squad and platoon level are key to enhancing the proficiency of 
the front-line AFP units.  Better mission planning and intelligence analysis has increased 
the capabilities of small unit leaders as well as staffs at the battalion level and higher.  As 
the AFP’s capabilities have increased, its effectiveness against the ASG has also 
increased and the ASG’s power over the population has diminished.   
2. The MNLF Threat 
Critical to the AFP’s effort on Jolo has been eliminating any possible MNLF 
support to the ASG.  To accomplish this, the AFP used Marine Colonel Dolorfino, a Sulu 
native and Muslim, to contact MNLF commanders on Jolo and encourage their support 
for the 1996 Peace Agreement between the GRP and MNLF.  The GRP also negotiated 
with the captured leader of the MNLF, Nur Misuari, to gain his continued support for the 
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peace agreement despite military operations on Jolo in pursuit of the ASG.  In the end, 
MNLF support was secured by the GRP and MNLF were voluntarily moved to no-fire 
zones on the island.41 
C. DEVELOPMENT 
1. The Value of Civil Military Operations 
While the PSF continues to target the ASG through military means, development 
of Jolo’s infrastructure and economy has proceeded simultaneously.  Providing security 
for the island’s inhabitants increases the legitimacy of the GRP, but is not the long-term 
solution.  The GRP must create an environment that will permanently discourage the 
growth of new insurgent leaders capable of destabilizing Jolo and inhibiting investment 
and development.  The AFP has been using Civil-Military Operations (CMO) in 
conjunction with its tactical operations to diminish or eliminate support of the ASG 
through highly publicized livelihood enhancement projects.  The U.S. provides a 
significant amount of monetary and material support to the AFP for execution of CMO. 
The U.S. country team in the Philippines works very closely with the U.S. forces 
operating on Jolo to plan and execute a variety of development and livelihood 
improvement projects.  This uncommon cooperation between Department of State and 
Department of Defense assets occurs thanks to a campaign plan that establishes near-term 
strategies to both defeat the ASG and provide immediate relief, as well as to create long-
term solutions to encourage development on Jolo and sever the ASG’s control over the 
island’s inhabitants.  While the U.S. plays a critical role in the CMO aspect of AFP 
operations on Jolo, the actual execution of the many projects is done by Filipinos, thereby 
helping to emphasize the role of the GRP in promoting local development. 
2. Humanitarian Assistance 
Many Humanitarian Assistance (HA) projects are designed to provide immediate 
relief and deliver short-term consequences.  Long-term results, however, can still come 
from the execution of small HA projects.  Providing materials to repair a school roof, for 
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example, costs very little and is an immediate demonstration of AFP concern for the 
well-being of children on Jolo.  A project like this also makes a new classroom available 
which may in turn provide an employment opportunity for a new teacher, reduce class 
sizes, and increase the quality of education students receive.  The immediate impact 
legitimizes GRP efforts on Jolo, at the same time it creates new opportunities for a better 
future. 
In this way, the AFP executes a variety of small but potentially high impact 
projects with the support of U.S. material and money.  Whether engaging in infrastructure 
development by repairing schools, wells, or clinics, or targeting the population directly 
through medical or veterinary assistance, U.S. and AFP CMO planners work together on 
Jolo to plan and execute projects that influence target populations and areas.  Doing so 
ensures resources are dedicated to the communities with the greatest need with the aim of 
achieving long lasting effects in return.  Maximizing the effects legitimizes further AFP 
operations within the targeted population or area, and also sets a foundation for future 
development. 
3. Infrastructure Development 
Addressing long-term development more directly poses a greater challenge on 
Jolo.  While many projects can be executed using military resources, the risk to security 
inhibits larger projects that are often beyond the capacity of the military to execute and 
that require cooperation from civilian agencies.  Security risks also prevent the 
participation of people capable of making long-term investments on Jolo such as business 
entrepreneurs, educators, or medical professionals.  Without investment in non-military 
development, however, there is the potential that Jolo will be stuck in a continuous cycle 
of poverty and instability.   
As on Basilan, a great deal of emphasis is being placed on the transportation 
infrastructure on Jolo.  Improving the road networks can serve many purposes that assist 
both the military and encourage development.  Improved access, for instance, allows PSF 
to gain access to and influence previously isolated populations.  Isolated communities 
will also benefit from improved access to education, medical care, and markets.  The 
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“farms to markets” campaign, introduced in 2005 on Jolo, was developed specifically to 
improve access to markets and encourage rural farmers to grow surplus crops that can be 
sold to earn them more income.42 
Other projects executed on Jolo include new wells to improve access to clean 
drinking water, training for medical providers, new clinics, and news schools to improve 
learning opportunities.  But, in many cases, these projects are not sustainable without 
improved security.  Not only are wells easy to destroy, but they also require routine 
maintenance, if they are to continue running properly.  Schools can only function if there 
are teachers.  Many teachers on Jolo live in Jolo Town, far from the villages they teach in 
and are, thus, under constant threat of being kidnapped because they have no kinship ties 
to the members of the communities in which they teach.  Medical care providers are 
influenced by similar threats.  Despite the construction of clinics in rural villages, there is 
no one trained to maintain the clinics or the equipment in them.  Many medical providers 
also only rotate through villages.  Few are willing to live in the impoverished conditions 
on Jolo and may serve only a short time on the island. 
                                                 
42 The campaign for “farms to markets” roads across Jolo was encouraged by military planners during 
the author’s time on Jolo in 2006.  Not only did the improved road network benefit the Jolo residents but 
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V. ADOLESCENT MALES IN TAUSUG SOCIETY 
A. MALE ROLE 
1. Common in All Societies 
Throughout history and in nearly every society that has been documented, males 
have held positions of power and influence.  This is not to say that females have been 
incapable of holding such positions, but that they are historically held by males.   Even 
today, while females participate in economics, politics, religion, and academia, their 
degree of influence may be overestimated.  In America, for example, it is widely thought 
that females wield considerable influence.  In fact, only 16% of elected seats in the U.S. 
Senate and House of Representatives are held by women.43 
One particular role that continues to be dominated by males is that of warfare.  Of 
course, females occupy roles within militaries, command soldiers, and even obtain high 
rank.  But when decisive action involving combat must be taken, this role belongs almost 
exclusively to males.  One sees this not just in the military application of warfare, but in 
areas of political influence as well.  According to some anthropologists, the physical 
evolution of males has predisposed them to be better at executing violence than females.  
Consequently – the argument goes – males have been able to dominate the roles 
described above.44 
2. Muslim Society 
Within Muslim societies, males are even more dominant in the public sphere.  Not 
only are political, military and economic positions dominated by males, but many 
Muslims believe men have a right to dominate thanks to the dictates of their religion.  
The woman’s place is carefully restricted, even in states where women do hold elected 
positions of authority.  Meanwhile, so long as males who believe this continue to hold 
positions of authority within Islam and preach this interpretation, and so long as women 
                                                 
43 Onlinewomeninpolitics.org, http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/wmnmap08_en.pdf  (accessed on 
November 21, 2009). 
44 Lionel Tiger, Men in Groups, (Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, 2009, Third Edition), 84. 
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in Muslim societies accept this interpretation as valid, then males in Muslim societies will 
continue to dominate most roles in the public sphere.  How Islam is interpreted in a 
particular society and how it is enforced is particularly important.  While there still are no 
recognized female roles within Islam for preaching or teaching Islam, different societies 
do value and tolerate contributions by females to social life very differently.45 
3. Tausug Society 
In traditional Tausug society, all public roles of authority and influence were held 
by males.  While this was in part due to the influence of Islam on Tausug society, it was 
also due to the acephalous nature of the social structure with no clearly defined or 
permanent hierarchy of leaders and constantly shifting patterns of loyalty .  A ‘headman’ 
was the most common leadership role in Tausug communities.  But the status of a 
headman could shift quickly and a family friendly to the headman one day could become 
his enemy the next.  As such, the threat of violence pervaded all aspects of social decision 
making. 
Ironically, while Islam’s influence in Tausug society constrained the public role 
of females, adolescent males were not bound by Islam’s influence until well into 
adulthood.    While it was not encouraged, it is not surprising that young men would seek 
their fortunes through banditry and piracy, or would kidnap young brides and engage in 
harrowing adventures to achieve status.46 
B. WHEN A MAN CAN BE A MAN 
1. Warfare 
As has already been noted, warfare is the exclusive domain of Tausug males.  
This is common in most modern societies and particularly those influenced by Islam.  
Warfare in Tausug society has been a common and deadly occurrence, particularly since 
                                                 
45 Muhammad Zubayr Siddiqi  Hadith Literature: Its Origins, Development & Special Features 
published by Islamic Texts Society (Cambridge, 1993) 142-153.  Dr. Siddiqi’s text provides historical 
references to the many female, Muslim scholars through history and highlights their value to the spread of 
Islam.  Siddiqi, however, does not provide one example of a female performing religious rites in Islam. 
46 Kiefer, The Tausug, 43, 83. 
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the arrival of firearms which have been abundant since World War II.  As such, headmen 
have taken on a greater role in settling disputes before they become violent. 
Traditionally, internal aggression was inhibited in Tausug society, particularly 
amongst close kin.  Therefore, it was only natural that males focused their aggression 
externally.47  The Tausugs are infamous for their pirate raids throughout the Sulu 
Archipelago, capturing slaves, livestock and other valuables.  What is most important to 
note is that in every case, whether involving banditry, piracy, or warfare between 
communities, all ventures were exclusively the domain of Tausug males.  There is no 
history of famous female pirates or family leaders.  This is not to say women in Tausug 
society were without influence, but in the realm of warfare, women have been wholly 
excluded. 
2. Crime 
A Western interpretation of crime may not accurately fit with a Tausug 
interpretation; crime in the Western sense amounts to what Tausugs would consider a 
form of reciprocity.  A Tausug male who feels disaffected with his current lot in life will 
feel justified in engaging in crime to better his situation.  As described by anthropologist 
Lionel Tiger, the criminal act is the individual’s “mastery of the environment through 
criminal means.”48  So long as the act is acceptable to society and until a headman steps 
in to resolve the situation, there may be an ever-escalating series of criminal acts between 
individuals or even communities.  This is as true for cases of accidentally killing 
someone else’s livestock as it is of killing a family member. 
Banditry and piracy fit this same pattern of acceptance.  To avoid the risk of 
affecting nearby communities, bandits or pirates often travel far from their own 
communities.  This prevents the accidental creation of animosity between neighboring 
communities that will unintentionally disrupt or put the lives of pirate families at risk.  
Among Tausugs, crime is very much the realm of young males.  It provides an 
opportunity for them to gain status and/or wealth, both of which are necessary for gaining 
                                                 
47 Tiger, Men in Groups, 190. 
48 Tiger, Men in Groups, 174. 
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influence within their respective communities or for attracting a bride.  As with warfare, 
females are discouraged from lives of crime, but unlike in warfare females are not 
protected from crime.  Women, children and the elderly can never be targeted in warfare; 
it is shameful to do so.  But females can be targeted by crime – but with severe penalties 
if the male perpetrator is brought to justice.49 
3. Politics 
Much like the social and family organization of Tausug society, Tausug politics 
can be confusing and fluid.  One constant, however, is that politics remained the 
exclusive domain of males.  Traditionally, headmen were not chosen or elected officials.  
They assumed leadership and authority through their influence over their communities.  
Because females were not afforded opportunities for significant social interaction outside 
their communities, they had no means to develop relations that led them to be able to 
influence others outside their households.  Females stayed relatively close to home while 
males traveled for work, trade, or even warfare.50 
The more social interactions a male had outside his community, the more 
influence he was likely to have in other communities.  Relationships were developed 
through kinship and friendship and strengthened through routine interactions.  These 
bonds could be further strengthened through forms of reciprocity.  An individual seeking 
to gain the loyalty and support of surrounding communities would demonstrate his 
loyalty through acts of generosity and friendship, thereby accumulating indebted 
dependents.  Ultimately, a male would accumulate a loyal following of kinsmen and 
friends and could then, if he so chose, challenge the authority of a local headman or 
assume the role himself upon a headman’s death.51 
                                                 
49 Kiefer, The Tausug, 38. 
50 Kiefer, The Tausug, 91. 
51 Kiefer, The Tausug, 92. 
 35
C. DECLINING MALE ROLES ON JOLO 
1. Government Intervention in Male Politics 
In pursuing the ASG on Jolo, the GRP risks alienating the population.  It is no 
secret that the ASG provides a safe haven to JI terrorists who must be captured or killed 
and, as such, the collateral death of Tausugs will likely harm relations between the 
victims’ families and the GRP.  It must also be accepted that interfering in internal 
politics will likewise alienate the population.  By forcing an alien, hierarchical form of 
leadership on Jolo’s inhabitants, the GRP, as well as the colonial authorities before it, 
have divided Tausug society and denied authority to traditional leaders. 
This is not meant to be a criticism of the current efforts to establish an effective 
governing body on Jolo but to identify the fissures created in Tausug society through the 
replacement of traditional systems of governance.  Headmen with years of influence and 
authority over their communities may be forced to defer to elected leaders with no prior 
social relations in the affected community.  One example from the author’s experience 
will highlight the detrimental effects of trying to introduce this alien form of 
organization.   
The municipality of Talipao is comprised of approximately 53 barangays, or 
communities.  Municipal mayors and barangay captains are elected from each 
corresponding constituency.  However, borders between communities are not fixed.  
Therefore, an influential family, perhaps one closely tied to the mayor, can claim 
residence in a neighboring barangay in an attempt to gain a political seat.  In the case in 
question, a barangay captain was elected to govern a barangay in which he had no social 
relations, either through kinship or friendship.  How this particular captain won the 
election was a mystery to members of the barangay who, it is important to note, were 
historically opposed to the elected municipal mayor.  Worse, the elected barangay captain 
received all funds from the government dedicated to the maintenance and operation of the 
barangay, which the local headmen claimed they never saw.  The most striking point is 
that the barangay captain, like the municipal mayor, moved off the island of Jolo to the 
city of Zamboanga on Mindanao.  Not only was his particular barangay thus governed in 
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absentia, but so was the entire municipality.  During the author’s eight-month visit to 
Talipao in 2006, the mayor returned to the island of Jolo only once and, on that occasion, 
never visited the municipality but instead stayed in Jolo Town. 
It should not be difficult to imagine what effect this GRP-initiated form of 
governance might have on the local population, particularly on males in traditional 
positions of authority.  The above example illustrates the difficulties with implementing a 
new system of governance.  Traditional male authority figures can become increasingly 
desperate as they see their way of life rapidly changing through the unwanted influence 
of a new government system that not only strips away their influence, but supplants it 
with the authority of non-traditional Tausug leaders. 
2. Rising Role of the Female 
In addition to male authority being eroded in this way, it is also under threat as 
females receive greater access to education.  Females are beginning to fill roles 
commonly occupied by males in traditional Tausug society.  Females, after all, are not 
expected to behave badly in their teen years and, therefore, benefit from completing 
school, as opposed to running off and getting into trouble.  This assertion is supported by 
a 1994 educational survey in which females led males in levels of education completed 
by as little as 3% and as much as 6%.  By 2003, according to another survey, the basic 
literacy rate of females versus males was 2.2% higher for ages 10–14 and 4.6% higher for 
ages 15–19.52  Most remarkable is that when you look longitudinally, males received 
considerably more education and had a much higher literacy rate only a generation or two 
prior. 
As females continue to advance in education, they are bound to assume roles once 
reserved exclusively for males.  For instance, secular schools established by the 
government are no longer run by Muslim male teachers and are predominately staffed by 
female teachers, particularly at the primary and intermediate education levels.  Nursing 
and clerical positions are dominated by females as well.  Tausug mothers can raise 
                                                 
52 National Statistics Office, Republic of the Philippines, 
http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/2003/fl03tabD.htm (accessed August 26, 2009). 
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children, as well as hold a job, and single women can bring home additional income to 
their families that they likely would not be able to when they marry at too young an age.  
While occupational opportunities available to women may not compare to the more high-
prestige roles associated with male leadership in Tausug society, these new roles increase 
female influence at the expense of male influence.  As males fail to fill these roles of 
influence, it is only natural that they will seek opportunities that re-privilege traditional 
roles of Tausug males.53 
3. Female Focused Development 
It goes without saying that to improve development there must be advances in 
education.  In traditional Tausug society, females did not receive much formal education, 
but they are the recipients of a greater focus on education in Jolo today.  Being educated 
means females are aware of choices and can make informed decisions regarding health, 
child rearing, and social interaction.   This benefits Tausug society because females raise 
healthier children and are likely to encourage their children to become educated as well.  
Statistics indicate that improved health and education is having a positive impact through 
a decrease in infant and mother mortality rates, higher levels of education completed 
(especially for females, as we have seen), and longer predicted life spans. 
But even if future generations of young males are successfully encouraged to 
complete school, what is available to them after schooling?  Without development that 
provides opportunities that fit with the prestige and status males feel they need to earn as 
Tausug males, adolescent males will be left to seek this on their own.54  When one takes 
into account the traditional Tausug acceptance that young men will behave badly, then 
having a healthier, better educated, but disaffected and unemployed cohort of young 
males could create a new generation of potential insurgents ripe for recruitment. 
                                                 
53 During the author’s visit to Jolo in 2006, he interacted with females serving as teachers, doctors and 
elected officials. 
54 Kiefer, The Tausug, 137. 
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D. WHAT MAKES THE ASG SO ATTRACTIVE 
1. Financial Gain 
The province of Sulu is the poorest province in the Philippines and, despite Jolo 
being the provincial capital, it fares no better than the rest of the Sulu Archipelago.  As 
already discussed, centuries of warfare and insurgency have minimized investment on 
Jolo and inhibited economic development.  Limited resources and land mean there are 
limited opportunities for adolescent males to either earn an income or status.  Without 
legitimate opportunities for financial gain, males may feel forced or enticed to seek out 
illicit opportunities.  The ASG’s involvement in so many profit-driven illicit activities 
makes the organization an effective option for those needing to earn an income.  The risk 
of associating with the ASG would certainly be readily acceptable by adolescent males 
seeking fortune and adventure.  And, with little emphasis on Islam for this particular age 
group, adolescent males would likely feel little sense of regret or remorse for their 
involvement. 
Adolescent males may find joining the ASG even easier if they believe their 
plight is a result of the government’s failure to improve their situation.  In such cases, 
disaffected males become ideal recruits for the ASG.  Not only can the ASG help men to 
financially improve their lot in life, but they would be joining an organization that allows 
them to take from the very people they hold responsible for their situation.  While 
representatives of the GRP would be obvious targets, it can be equally easily argued that 
taking from Christians or foreigners is justified since neither are Tausug and both appear 
to be exploiting Jolo for their gain and not for the betterment of Tausugs. 
2. Status 
The fact that adolescent males seek to achieve some degree of status is common 
in all societies.55  Tausug society is no different.  Not only is status important to 
teenagers, but it is equally valuable as a teen matures into manhood.  Leadership in 
traditional Tausug society is based on acquired status; the greater your status the greater 
                                                 
55 Tiger, Men in Groups, 84, 172. 
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your influence and betterment for your family.  The warrior tradition of the Tausugs puts 
heavy emphasis on status achieved through bravery in battle.56 
If an adolescent male has no opportunity in legitimate society to achieve status, 
then the ASG offers an avenue for attaining status in keeping with traditional Tausug 
values.  Some males may choose to join or help the ASG to impress family, friends 
and/or especially females.57  Others may be impacted by the depressed economic 
conditions, and therefore seek fame and fortune from the only means available outside 
legitimate society.  The most dangerous potential recruits, however, may be those 
disaffected youth who truly want to achieve status through legitimate means, but have no 
opportunity for advanced education or employment.  In such cases, individuals will be 
drawn to the ASG’s initial raison d’etre or they may come to believe they can advance 
their cause as well as the Tausug people’s cause through participation in ASG activities.  
The disaffected adolescent males in today’s Tausug society can become the future 
ideologues who bring the ASG back from profit-driven activities to those focused on an 
Islamist agenda.   
3. The Thrill of Danger 
Being a male, in general, involves some degree of emphasis on physical 
bravery.58  The emphasis correlates with the value a society places on bravery.  
Traditional Tausug society placed a great deal of emphasis on physical bravery that then 
evolved into the Tausug warrior tradition.  Boys are inculcated at a young age with the 
idea of facing danger bravely and are spared from Islamic traditions that would prohibit 
an adolescent male from taking risks and seeking danger.  To return to Lionel Tiger’s 
point, facing danger offers an opportunity for mastery of the environment, along with 
possible rewards of status and/or wealth. 
                                                 
56 Kiefer, The Tausug, 83. 
57 Anna Simons, “Axis of Trouble: Male Youth, Factional Politics and Religion,” Long-term strategy 
project, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, September 2005, 11. 
58 Tiger, Men in Groups, 182. 
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Seeking out danger also fills an adolescent male’s need for self-validation.59  
Young males will seek out and attach themselves to figures or role models who they 
respect or seek to be like.  Adolescent males everywhere daydream about adventure, 
excitement, fame, and wealth, all of which can be offered by the ASG.  Participation in 
an organization such as the ASG enables adolescent males to break societal taboos by, for 
example, using guns and drugs, and gives them the opportunity to show their bravery and 
achieve status among their superiors and peers. 
E. CAN ADOLESCENT MALES BE DETERRED 
1. Revival of the Tausug Identity 
As critical as economic investment is to changing the conditions of poverty and 
insecurity on Jolo, the island’s inhabitants also need to sustain their Tausug identity.  
How to encourage this without it leading to resistance against the GRP presents a real 
challenge.  Little is being done by traditional Tausug leaders to mobilize the Tausugs.  
While armed struggle against government authority is rational given the Tausugs’ self-
image as a warrior society, Tausugs today need to realize the value of a unified Tausug 
people determined to better their collective lives.  Some form of Jolo-wide service could 
potentially be a mobilizing force capable of changing the development and security 
situation on Jolo. 
While assigned to Jolo in 2006, an Army team of advisors witnessed how quickly 
local civilians could be mobilized for labor projects.60  The Tausug locals were paid no 
more than $3 (U.S.) a day for their labor, but proved both capable and accustomed to any 
manner of physical work.  Initially, the locals were hired to push the jungle back from the 
AFP camp perimeter.  They worked diligently and took great pride in putting in a full 
eight to ten hours every day.  By engaging the locals in this way, the American advisors 
and their AFP counterparts identified a method that would not only provide income to 
Tausug males, but that enabled them to interact with the Tausugs on a fair and routine 
                                                 
59 Tiger, Men in Groups, 183. 
60 The author cites this example from personal experience during his visit to Jolo in 2006. 
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basis.  A variety of projects were subsequently planned that required extensive manual 
labor with the idea these would benefit the locals following completion of the projects. 
For instance, males from many barangays formed work parties under AFP 
supervision and cleared the dense jungle vegetation along the roads and trails throughout 
the area.  When gravel was provided, again the local males pitched in to improve the 
roads.  In just this one example, small communities were connected to larger 
communities both through the work, but also the finished project which worked to 
increase communications as well as access to markets.  Security forces and medical 
providers also gained greater access to the once isolated communities, strengthening 
relations and improving livelihoods.  The benefits of such road improvement projects 
were immediate and long-term, and were enjoyed by the local Tausugs as well as the 
government’s PSF. 
While the projects were not designed to be long-term work projects, they were 
designed to organize Tausugs to improve their own local environment.  In some cases, 
the local Tausug leadership would routinely organize work parties to sustain the work 
completed.  In these cases, those in the work parties were volunteers.  Presumably these 
were Tausugs who appreciated the benefits gained from the work and desired to maintain 
the project or improve it.  Clearly, then, it should be possible to organize Tausugs at a 
larger level to conduct public work projects across Jolo.  A variety of approaches could 
be used.  Public service might be one option for youth not engaged in school or seeking 
opportunities beyond high school.   
Public service encourages male youth to take part in bettering their lot in life as 
well as the lives of the rest of the inhabitants on Jolo.  In addition to the many valuable 
lessons learned through hard work and accomplishment, training and education can be 
incorporated to reinforce the values of Tausug society as well as prepare young males for 
potential future employment.  While the example above illustrates how volunteers can be 
mobilized at no cost, paying adolescent males a minimum wage not only satisfies a need 
for income, but provides that income at no risk compared to not granting young males 
access to spending money which only encourages them to acquire it through illicit means.  
Offering a means by which young males can earn money would provide one much 
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needed improvement in domestic security on Jolo.  As the effects of a public service 
organization became more visible or tangible across Jolo, a sense of national pride would 
develop not just among the adolescent males involved, but ideally across the island of 
Jolo among all Tausugs.61 
2. Government over Insurgency 
How else can the GRP make the ASG unattractive to the Jolo Tausugs?  That is, 
can it effectively sever the link between the ASG and the population without winning 
Tausug hearts and minds?  It will likely take years before the GRP will be viewed as the 
legitimate government in Jolo by the Tausugs.  But the GRP only needs to be slightly 
more attractive than the ASG.  The risk attached to supporting or joining the ASG is high, 
as was demonstrated in 2006 when the PSF aggressively pursued and killed many ASG, 
bringing their estimated total down to fewer than 400.62  But, it also shouldn’t be 
forgotten that the risk associated with participation is also what keeps attracting new 
recruits and winning support (even if only tacit) from the population.  Thus, it is not 
enough to sever the ASG’s influence over the population. 
A great deal of effort continues to be expended to win the hearts and minds of the 
Tausug population and, with patience, this will likely make a difference.  But for this to 
stick will require that Jolo be developed in a way that will provide greater opportunities 
for adolescent males overall.  Actions must be taken that will encourage investment on 
Jolo specifically designed to give adolescent males opportunity to achieve status or 
wealth with just enough “risk” to prevent them from wanting to join an illicit or insurgent 
organization.  Meaningful employment that provides income above the poverty line and 
offers a chance for advancement should be much more appealing than being tracked 
down by the PSF. 
Emphasis on the high risk of joining the ASG is critical to reducing recruitment, 
especially if it can be paired with the right kind of development efforts by the GRP.  
Programs are currently in place that provide alternative livelihoods and teach new skills, 
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62 Chalk, “US Security Assistance,” 7 and Adams, “In Basilan.” 
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but affect only a small portion of the Jolo population.  During the Huk Rebellion of the 
1950s, the GRP expended the effort to relocate surrendered or captured rebels, teach 
them a new way of life, and give them land or business loans to enable them to pursue 
that legitimate new life.  While what was offered may not have been ideal for everything 
the rebels hoped for, it provided them a means of livelihood that was more appealing than 
the risk of armed rebellion, especially when they had families to support.  Tausugs do not 
need to love the GRP, but life must be just good enough to deter thoughts of rebellion or 
a life of crime. 
3. Social Clubs 
Social clubs (and associations) provide opportunities for people to communicate, 
share experiences, and develop relations.63  Social clubs tailored to adolescent males on 
Jolo can accomplish the same ends, but do so at the expense of ASG recruitment if 
membership in the club offers equal or greater satisfaction than membership in the ASG.  
It was noted above that the ASG offers excitement and holds allure for adolescent males 
because of the all-male social interactions involved, as well as the potential to achieve 
higher status.64  Alternative organizations can be developed that focus the attention and 
energy of adolescent males in a more productive, but equally compelling manner. 
Social organizations exist in Jolo Town in the form of school, athletic, and 
academic programs.  Expanding these throughout the island is an ideal way to both 
encourage social networking outside common community relations and to also encourage 
a healthy competition among adolescents that also leads to pride and a sense of 
accomplishment.  Athletic and academic competitions are but two approaches.   
Organizations could also mobilize adolescent males for the benefit of Tausug society.   
For instance, adolescent males who intend to stay near home and maintain 
traditional farms can benefit from organizations that emphasize agricultural or veterinary 
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64 Simons, “Axis of Trouble,” 11. 
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advancement.  Perhaps clubs could replicate the Future Farmers of America or 4 H, and 
could foster culturally appropriate, healthy competitions and contests among those raising 
livestock or produce.  Maybe adolescents could then ‘mature’ to joining granges.  
Associations of this sort would not only offer adolescent males opportunities to achieve 
status through healthy competition, but would help steer them toward improving 
traditional occupations like farming that would in turn improve the lot of Tausugs in 
general. 
With the security of Jolo constantly in question, the AFP would be well-
positioned to develop and organize social organizations alongside local Tausug leaders 
until the situation is secure enough for civilians to assist.  An AFP partnership with the 
Tausug communities would reduce barriers and increase trust.  Adolescent males who 
have a positive experience with the AFP and who benefit from a social organization the 
AFP helps sponsor should have less interest in then participating in an organization 
focused on insurgent or illicit activity.  Active GRP or AFP participation in Tausug 
society would also demonstrate that the future of Jolo matters to Manila and that together 
all level of government can work to make a difference. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The ASG represents a national insurgent threat with global potential.  The 
organization has shown its deadly capability against the GRP and U.S. forces operating in 
the Philippines.  The ASG’s Islamist history and ties to Al Qaeda through the JI make the 
ASG a relevant threat to U.S. interests abroad and to the security of the Philippines.  
While the ASG does enjoy external support it is still a nationalist movement whose 
primary focus is an independent Muslim state in the Sulu Archipelago.  To effectively 
counter the ASG’s influence on Jolo and sever its ties with the population it is critical to 
better understand the Tausug people, the primary recruitment and support base for the 
ASG. 
The Tausugs still maintain many traditions from their celebrated past.  Influenced 
by Islam for over 700 years, but holding on to many non-Muslim traditions, the Tausugs 
have resisted domination by foreign colonizers for nearly 500 years.  Following 
Philippine independence in 1946, the Tausugs continued to resist control by the 
Christian-dominated government.  No Tausug considers himself a Filipino, but rather a 
Tausug and Muslim first.  Many insurgent organizations have emerged in the Muslim-
dominated southern Philippines seeking independence.  On the Tausug-dominated Jolo 
Island, the ASG continues to resist GRP authority.  Although most of the ASG’s current 
operations are profit-driven illicit activities, its survival can be attributed to the strong 
family ties of the Tausug people.  As with many counterinsurgencies, then, effort must 
focus on severing the ties between the ASG and the Tausug population. 
The U.S. has worked closely with the GRP since 2002 to target and destroy the 
ASG and its Islamist supporters, the JI.  While the U.S.-supported AFP has had 
significant success in reducing the number of active ASG, the AFP is also working 
diligently to secure Jolo and encourage development through non-kinetic military 
operations.  An unprecedented amount of cooperation between U.S. forces and the U.S. 
country team in Manila has contributed large sums of money and resources to aid the 
AFP in its efforts.  Some projects, however, lack long term goals or are not sustainable by 
the local population.  Many projects fail to target the primary recruitment base for the 
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ASG and the link that binds the organization to the Tausug population, and to the ASG’s 
ultimate pool of potential recruits – adolescent males.  This is not to say that emphasis on 
women or the rest of the population is unimportant but that the development efforts too 
often ignore the needs of adolescent males. 
Reared in a society that still embraces its warrior traditions, adolescent males find 
the ASG appealing for many valid reasons, when explained from within a Tausug frame.  
The tangled network of social relations that governs a Tausug’s daily social interactions 
depends heavily on influence.  To advance the interests of a Tausug’s kinsmen, influence, 
whether political, monetary or military, is critical.  While Jolo is an impoverished island, 
the inhabitants are still acutely aware of the development of the world around them.  
Since an adolescent male cannot improve his lot through legitimate means, he will seek 
his fame or fortune through organizations such as the ASG. 
The adventurous nature of adolescent males is a given of human nature.  
Fortunately, the energy of these males is often channeled to productive efforts that 
provide males with a sense of accomplishment and maybe even status.  To the Tausug 
male, status is necessary to influence social networks and advance his and his family’s 
goals.  Wealth is difficult to accumulate on Jolo, but achieving status through bravery is 
respected and maybe even of greater worth.  An adolescent male may be able to acquire 
some wealth through participation in the ASG, but he will most certainly be able to 
impress his peers and superiors through acts of bravery in battle.  The challenge, then, is 
how to provide adolescent males legitimate opportunities for gaining status and wealth 
that are more alluring than the risks associated with participating in the ASG. 
Long-term projects focusing on increased education and improved healthcare will 
improve the future for all inhabitants of Jolo, but could lead to unintended consequences 
if these projects are not coupled with some amount of development, and development 
targeted specifically at adolescent males.  If the status quo is maintained and security 
never established, then investment and development will not come to Jolo.  The 
previously mentioned efforts will then result in a new generation of healthy, educated, 
and disaffected adolescent males.  Until development comes to Jolo and new economic 
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opportunities are created, alternatives are necessary to channel the energy of adolescent 
males and deter their participation in illicit or insurgent activities. 
The AFP is the ideal organization for leading this effort, in part because it is 
already in place.  Already established as authority figures, soldiers can be role models to 
young men, particularly Tausug adolescents who cherish the warrior tradition.  This may 
seem contradictory since the AFP is a symbol of the GRP, but the AFP has developed the 
strongest ties to the Tausug population, no doubt due to the corruption associated with the 
civilian government and police force.  The AFP is also equipped with teams trained to 
conduct civil-military operations and many are staffed by Muslims to facilitate 
interactions with Tausug society.  These teams could help create and manage public 
service organizations, social clubs, sports teams, etc. that emphasize some form of 
community service and provide a competitive outlet whereby males can achieve status 
legitimately. 
The routine interaction of the AFP with these teams, clubs, and organizations 
should help overcome barriers and build trust in the AFP as the GRP’s source of security 
for Jolo.  These service and social organizations would emphasize pride in the Tausug 
identity and, over time, seek to improve the relationship between Tausugs and the 
government.  If programs can be created that appeal to the adolescent male’s need for 
adventure and status then the ASG’s recruitment base will dwindle.  With over 80% of 
the organization’s strength comprised of males under the age of 25, the COIN strategy on 
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